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Abstract 
 
The inherent conflicts between objectives in fisheries management (e.g. MSY vs. conservation interests) 
are a hurdle for managers and scientists. However, some objectives may be compatible (e.g. economic 
yield and ecosystem preservation, Hilborn 2007) and could promote stakeholder consensus. The purpose 
of this study is to explore the “zone of new consensus” as outline by Hilborn (2007) and to develop a 
formal and quantitative approach to defining fisheries management objectives through stakeholder-
specific utility functions. First, multiple objectives are reflected in a clearly defined utility function for each 
stakeholder group. Second, simulations are run to find the resulting stakeholder groups’ utility. The 
preliminary results illustrate a formal route towards deriving appropriate management regimes with focus 
on compatible management goals to promote a new paradigm of stakeholder consensus, incentives, and 
success in fishery management. 
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As fish stocks continue to face substantially higher fishing levels than advised by scientists, both in Europe 
and other parts of the world, the need to manage fishing activity becomes direr. New strategies for the 
management of marine fisheries, including the development and evaluation of management procedures 
and harvest control rules (HCRs) are currently important research topics for many countries (Cochrane et 
al. 1998, Butterworth and Punt 1999, Cadrin 1999, Geromont et al. 1999, Ibaibarriaga et al. 2005, Lillegård 
et al. 2005). Fisheries management in Europe has traditionally focused on short-term projections for 
setting quotas according to conservation measures (Kelly 2006). Today, many fisheries managers and 
international advisory institutions (e.g., the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, ICES) aim 
at more strategic, long-term fisheries management. The scientific challenge is to understand how such 
management strategies may work. 
 
Hilborn (2007) emphasizes that fisheries management needs clear objectives in order to be evaluated. In 
fisheries, the setting of such objectives will usually involve the resource’s stakeholders (Baelde 2005, 
Paramor et al. 2005). However, due to the nature of multiple and conflicting objectives in fisheries 
(Horwood and Griffith 1992, Cochrane et al. 1998, Hilborn 2007) such as high yield vs. conservation, 
fisheries management objectives have often remained unclear (Horwood and Griffith 1992, ICES 2007). 
 
One way to clarify different objectives in fisheries is through the use of utility functions. These can help to 
quantify and rank different biological, social, or economic objectives (Quinn and Deriso 1999). The 
optimizing of a utility function enables the objective derivation of a management strategy, even though the 
selection of a utility function will always be subjective.  
 
Because there is no “one size fits all” management strategy for fisheries (Caddy and Seijo 2005), a need 
arises to understand basic patterns of harvest strategy derivation and implementation. Therefore, our 
approach in this study is a generic one using a simple population model. Stochasticity may cause 
qualitative changes in predictions relative to deterministic models (Lande et al. 1994, 1995, 2003) and 
therefore will be included in this approach. Especially for long-term advice, stochastic considerations 
should be used in designing management procedures or rules (Kelly 2006). 
 
The motivation of this paper is the “zone of new consensus” described by Hilborn (2007) (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Hilborn’s (2007) schematic drawing of conflicts between four different fisheries management objectives. This figure is 
the motivation for this study of the “zone of new consensus”. Reproduced from Hilborn 2007. 
 
In Figure 1, increasing fishing effort beyond certain levels leads to a decrease in yield, profit and ecosystem 
preservation. Employment, however, is assumed to be increasing with increasing effort and helps justify 
the “zone of traditional management”.  
 
Current deficiencies in fisheries management within the EU are the lack of a formal framework for drafting 
and ranking specific stakeholder objectives, in conjunction with the lack of a transparent and 
communicable approach to management. The aim for this research is therefore to work towards the 
development of such a framework, following a perspective outlined by Hilborn (2007). 
 
We illustrate a formal route towards deriving appropriate management regimes with focus on compatible 
management goals in the “zone of new consensus” to promote stakeholder consensus, incentives, and 
thereby success in fishery management. 
Methods 
This work uses a population model semi-parameterized for a “cod-like” fish stock and a utility model to 
represent three different stakeholder preferences to produce a general foundation for HCR theory.  
 
We explore different harvest regimes that reflect the trade-offs between different objectives of fisheries 
management (i.e., yield, employment, profit and biological conservation; after Hilborn (2007).  
Population model 
Following Heino (1998), we use an age-structured population model. The simulated population is 
represented by Na(t), where N is the number of individuals at time t and a represents age classes where a = 
0, 1, …, amax. Individuals that reach amax die. Natural mortality rate M and recruitment to the fishery are 
age-class specific. Stochasticity is implemented in the recruitment function and in the implementation of 
fishing mortality (F) to mimic variations in environment and fishing. The stock is harvested instantaneously 
once a year according to the F level prescribed and updated annually. Density dependence occurs at the 
egg stage (N0) and length at age is derived from von Bertanlanffy’s growth equation. Fecundity is weight 
dependent and age at maturity occurs at age 5.  
 
The stakeholders 
We use three different broadly defined stakeholder groups from which to derive the utility functions and 
preferences: fishermen, society and conservationists. Weights on each utility component (the concrete 
definitions are given in the next section) for a given stakeholder’s utility function represent the stakeholder 
group’s preferences for each utility component. The sum of all weights is equal to 1.0. Table 1 illustrates 
the stakeholder utility weights for the simulation scenarios. In a real world scenario, each stakeholder 
group would provide these weights themselves based on a consensus within the group. 
 
In this preliminary study, we assume each stakeholder group holds a consensus within its group. We also 
assume each stakeholder group differs between the other two stakeholder groups in order to reproduce 






Table 1. Utility components (yield, employment, profit and stock level) with their units and corresponding weights for each 
stakeholder group (fishermen, society and conservationists). The inset histogram shows the linear realtionship bbetween the 
utility components (Ci) and their utility to the stakeholder group. For each stakeholder, the utility weights add up to 1.  
 
Utility model 
Based on Hilborn (2007), four utility components that correspond to specific management objectives are 
used: (1) yield, Y; (2) employment, E; (3) profit, P and (4) ecosystem preservation, S. The values of these 
utility components will be extracted from the numerical model based on, respectively,  
(1) annual yield (kilograms): aaF wNetY a  )1()(   
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B(t) is the total stock biomass (in kilograms) at time t and C(t) is the total catch (in kilograms) at time t. E1/2 
and α are scaling parameters where α has the unit of kilograms-1 to make Eshore dimensionless.  
 
 
(3) difference between revenue and cost (€): ) E(-   )()( ttCtP  , where β is the price per kilogram and 
γ is a parameter of cost per unit effort. 
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The utility at time t for each of the stakeholder groups is calculated once a year with their appropriate 
weights ( ): SSPPEEYY ttttt )(U)(U)(U)(U)U(   
 
Total utility is then calculated through time averaging. 
Utility normalization 
In order for the different utility components to be comparable to each other, normalization of the units 
should occur. To do this, values were found for each utility component according to maximum sustainable 
levels; for yield: maximum sustainable yield (MSY); for employment: employment based on the harvest 
regime’s highest allowable F level; for profit: maximum profit assuming a fixed cost of unit effort and a 
fixed price per kilogram of yield; for stock level: the carrying capacity of the stock at zero harvest levels. 
 
These utility components are thus normalized individually, based on their maximum possible value, and 
presented as a percent of that maximum value. This approach facilitates the assessment of proposed 
harvest strategies by stakeholders.  
Results & Discussion 
 
First, the model was run with a range of fishing mortality (0-5.0) to show trends in the utility component 
values. The stock collapsed at a fishing mortality rate of 4.0. Figure 2 illustrates our model’s trends which 
behave similarly with Hilborn’s (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 2. The four utility components (yield, employment, profit and stock level) and their values (kilograms, person years, €, and 
kilograms, respectively) according to increasing fishing mortality (F). Values for employment are plotted on the second y-axis. 
The stock crashed at a F level of 4.0. The averages for each F level are derived using two different F values , each for 1000 years 
after a 200 year priming phase. 
 
We then ran two separate simulations, one to represent high fishing mortality rates and one with lower 
fishing mortality rates. In Figure 3, one can see the trade-offs of the utility components values and fishing 
mortality (F) rate level. Effort at shore-side proportionally increases with catches (yield), which decrease 
with increasing F due to stock depletion. However, in these two simulation scenarios we put more 
emphasis on employment at sea than on the shore such that increasing F would give increasing 
employment even though catches were decreasing. Therefore, one observes a linear increasing trend of 
employment (Esea + Eshore) with fishing mortality in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 3. The four utility components (yield, employment, profit and stock level) and their relative values to their maximum 
through a simulation time of 100 years after a 1000 year priming phase using two different fishing mortality (F) values. The 
second axis for the “stock level” histogram corresponds to the F value of 2.0. 
 
The lower F of 0.5 gives better values for yield, profit and stock level. Only employment, as also inferred in 
Hilborn (2007), has higher values with increased F level of 2.0. This occurs due to the model assumption 
that higher F values increase the effort out at sea ten times more than effort at the shore. 
 
In Figure 4, both fishermen and conservationists have higher utility values with the lower F value of 0.5. 
Society, with the arbitrarily assumed most weight on employment (see Table 2), receives a much higher 
utility with higher F values.  
 
 
Figure 4. Two stakeholder groups and their resulting utility (dimensionless) for two different fishing mortality (F) values. Utility 
values are averages for 100 years after a 1000 year priming phase using two different fishing mortality (F) values. (Society is not 
included in this figure due to scaling differences, see text for an explanation of Society’s utility levels.) 
 
 
Figure 4 shows that fishermen do better than conservationists in both simulations. This is due to the 
assumption we made that conservationists put most weight on stock level, which has a baseline value at 
“virgin” stock levels. If the conservationists were satisfied with a more realistic baseline value (i.e. satisfied 
with a minimally-fished stock level instead of a non-harvest level), their utility would have increased for 
both simulations. 
 
These preliminary results suggest that reducing effort (for example decommissioning of fishing vessels) 
would be a first logical step in reaching the “zone of new consensus”. It should be specified that 
decommissioning small vessels only to let the largest, and most effective, boats survive does not help in 
reducing overall effort. 
 
We note that the stakeholder groups’ preferences for utility components would naturally be set by the 
stakeholder groups themselves, instead of values set here for simulation purposes. This implies consensus 
within the stakeholder group, something we feel the EU Regional Advisory Committees (RACs) have helped 
achieve in recent years. This framework we present can accommodate many more stakeholder groups 
than the three presented in this paper. 
 
Future work in this project will examine the differences between linear and Holling Type 2 (diminishing 
returns) functional relationships of stakeholder benefits and utility components. Also discounting future 
returns (i.e. revenue, employment, stock level) will shed more light on the tradeoffs of management 
objectives and make this framework more realistic. 
 Conclusions 
 
In this study, we show preliminary results that support Hilborn’s described “zone of new consensus” where 
fishermen’s profit and conservationists’ ecosystem preservation are consistent with each other. We 
provide a new type of management framework for fisheries: one that gives a “voice” to different 
stakeholder groups that inherently have conflicting objectives. Through this framework, stakeholder 
preferences can be translated into utility functions and then weighed against different management 
regimes and scenarios. This approach thus makes fisheries management more transparent and more 
interactive between scientist and stakeholder; two goals in which ICES must excel. 
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